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TORTS TO EXPECTANCIES IN DECEDENTS' ESTATES
By ALvIN E.

EVANS t

It is no part of the purpose of this paper to trace the confused history of the progressive extension of a tort remedy for the protection of
interests in advantageous relations. Since Lumley v. Gye 1 much
progress has been made. Prospective advantages may be protected. 2
There is no longer any doubt that a person cannot force an employer to
dismiss an employee, in order to serve some ulterior and non-competitive purpose of that person. 3 It seems that the expectancy of a beneficiary in the proceeds of an insurance policy upon the life of the insured
is on the way toward protection against the wrongful interference of a
third person. 4 The question of the protection to be extended to expectancies in decedents' estates from fraudulent interference seems to
occupy a twilight zone and is the subject matter of this paper.
In these expectancy cases the plaintiff may allege wrongful interference, to his injury (i) in the procuring by the defendant of the execution of a will; (2) in the prevention of the execution of a will; (3) in
causing the revocation or alteration of a will; (4) in the prevention of
the revocation or alteration of a will; (5) in the suppression or spoliation of a will; and (6) in obtaining by fraud an inter vivos conveyance
from the source.
Possible remedies depending somewhat upon the type of interference are: (i) the raising of a constructive trust; (2) resistance to or
setting aside of probate in the probate court; (3) setting aside of probate in equity; (4) a tort action for wrong to the plaintiff's expectancy
or some substantially equivalent action at law or in equity.
Professor Gifford has said that "ejectment is a purely legal remedy and can be brought only by one having a legal right in the land
I A. B., 1898, Cotner University; A. M., 1898, University of Nebraska; Ph. D.,
Igo8, University of Michigan; J. D., 1918, University of Michigan; Dean, University
of Kentucky College of Law, since 1927. Author: ROMAN LAw STUDIES IN LIvY
(igio), and of numerous articles in leading legal periodicals.
I. 2 El. & BI. 216, 118 E. R. 749 (Q. B. 1853). See Walker v. Cronin, 1O7 Mass.
555 (1871) ; Rice v. Manley, 66 N. Y. 82 (1876) (the contract protected need not be
enforceable).
e. Carnes v. St. Paul Union Stockyards Co., 164 Minn. 457, 205 N. W. 63o
(1925) ; Delz v. Winfree, 8o Tex. 400, 16 S. W. 11 (1891).
3. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Horn, 2o6 Ill. 493, 69 N. E. 526 (19o3);
Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485, 59 N. E. 125 (19O); Warschauser v. Brooklyn
Furniture Co., 159 App. Div. 81, 144 N. Y. Supp. 257 (2d Dep't 1913). For the New
of non-union
York rule regarding closed shop and the procurement of the discharge
workers, see National Protective Ass'n v. Cumming, 17 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 (1902),
and PRossma, TORTS (1941) 976, I00I, 1004.
4. Munroe v. Beggs, 91 Kan. 701, 139 Pac. 422 (1914) ; Daugherty v. Daugherty,
152 Ky. 732, 154 S. W. 9 (1913). Contra: Alfsen v. Crouch, 115 Tenn. 352, 89 S. W.
329 (19o5). See also Ross v. Wright, 286 Mass. 269, ig N. E. 514 (1934), 98 A. L. R.
(187)
468 (1935).
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and yet it is the sole remedy against a devisee who by fraud in the
inducement has persuaded a testator to devise land away from the
heir." 5 Professor Warren, in an article on "Fraud, Undue Influence
and Mistake in Wills," 6 does not touch upon the matter of a tort remedy at any length, commenting merely upon two cases. He raises the
question, Is there any objection to allowing the victim an election
whether to raise his claim in the probate court or later in a common
law court? It is further suggested that if he may sue in tort, he may
also waive the tort and sue in assumpsit for benefits received. Warren finds nine situations that arise: (i) cases where the probate court
has jurisdiction and can do complete justice by refusing probate;
(2)
cases where claimant has been defrauded of a legacy where the
probate court can afford no remedy; (3) cases of express trusts;
(4)cases where there was an oral promise to hold in trust; (5) cases
where the problem is one of construction; (6) cases of fraudulent
revocation and prevention of republication; (7) cases of fraudulent
prevention of revocation; (8) cases where the fraud of defendant has
created a difficulty respecting proof; (9) cases of forged wills defrauding the next of kin. This article purposely omits some of the items
suggested by Professor Warren, such as express trusts, oral promises
to hold in trust, and questions of construction in general.
An initial proposition is that only probate courts have jurisdiction to probate wills and that a probate decree, like other judgments
and decrees, is not subject to collateral attack. There is a disposition
also on the part of courts to hold that if a claimant has an adequate
remedy in the probate court, he should not first resort to a court of
general jurisdiction.
i. The Wrongful Procurement of a Will
In Langdon v. Blackburn,7 the plaintiff sought to have the court
declare the defendant a constructive trustee because of his having induced the decedent to sign a will at a ,time when he was unconscious
and without testamentary capacity. The plaintiff alleged that she,
sister and next of kin, was in a distant land and did not learn of the
death of the decedent and the probate of his alleged will until after
it was too late to contest it. The court held that this was an allegation
of intrinsic and not extrinsic fraud, and so the plaintiff was making a
collateral attack upon the probate decree. Since there is no jurisdiction in equity to set aside probate, a possible alternative would be a
5.Gifford, Will or No Will? The Effect of Fraud and Undue Influence on Testainentary Instruntents (I92O) 2o CoL. L. REv. 862, 869.
6. (1928) 41 HARv.L. IEV. 309, 320-2.
7. io9 Cal. 19, 41 Pac. 814 (1895).
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tort action for the wrong done to the plaintiff's expectancy. This was
not attempted. It appears that a petition in the probate court to set
probate aside would be too late. It was assumed that a successful will
contest and an action for tort to the expectancy as alternative remedies
would reach substantially the same result. Not only is a will contest
to be preferred 8 in such case, but it is the logical remedy, inasmuch as
the defendant's wrongful act is without effect if the contestant establishes his claim. Since a will contest was no longer possible, due to
lapse of time, so also was an action in tort not available.
In Hall v. Hall9 the issues, as finally construed by the court, involved (i) a transfer procured to be made by the plaintiff's father to
the defendants, co-heirs of certain property, for the purpose of defeating the plaintiff's expectancy, induced by a false representation made
to the grantor respecting plaintiff's sanity; (2) a will procured to be
made also by the plaintiff's father, by a similar fraudulent representation, giving property to the defendants which would otherwise have
come to the plaintiff; (3) the false imprisonment of the plaintiff
whereby the latter and his conservator were prevented from contesting
probate of the will until the period for contest had elapsed. The
defendant demurred.
Issue (i) is reserved, for the present. As to issue (2), it was
held that the plaintiff could not proceed by a tort action without setting aside the probate decree for fraud. He could pray only for an
injunction to restrain the defendants from setting up the probate decree as a bar to his assertion of an interest in the property or that
they be ordered to account for the property as intestate assets. He
could not pray for damages for a tort to his expectancy for this would
be a collateral attack upon the probate decree. Yet the court asserted
that the complaint contained sufficient allegations of fraud practiced on
the court which would warrant a prayer for equitable relief but not
for damages such as might ordinarily be assessed in an action at law.
Such equitable relief does not result in a constructive trust but rather
in setting aside a void decree. If the probate decree was void, as it
clearly seems to have been, then the tort action was not a collateral
attack and that particular ground for refusal of a common law action
would seem to fail.
The court viewed the case as one calling for equitable relief only.
The probate decree should first be set aside. When that has been
done, defendant's wrongful act has failed of its purpose and the property passed to all the co-heirs, including the plaintiff. Thus, an action
8. See Axe v. Wilson, I5O Kan. 794, 96 P. (2d)
9. 91 Conn.

514,

IOO Atl.

441

(1916).

880 (1939).
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in tort would fail for lack of damages. The fraud practiced here is
such as would be denominated in California, extrinsic fraud. So far
as appears, adequate relief could be achieved without resort to any
other than the probate court.
In Seeds v. Seeds 1I a father was alleged to have forged his wife's
will, by which he acquired her property for himself and deprived the
plaintiffs, her infant children, of their inheritance; procured it to be
probated by perjured testimony; and prevented the plaintiff heirs from
receiving notice of and contesting probate by accepting notice for them
as their guardian. Defendant, transferee of the father, with notice,
demurred to the petition and the court, on finding the above allegations
to be admitted, declared him to be a constructive trustee. Since the
allegations point toward the probate decree being void, a collateral
attack in an action for damages would appear to be permissible also.
The probate decree was void because the plaintiffs were deprived of
their statutory right to be heard.
The problem of forged wills is an old one. Perhaps the most
famous case is that of Broderick's Will." There the plaintiff petitioned the chancellor alternatively to set the probate of a forged will
aside or to charge the defendants as trustees. The will had been probated eight years previously and it was held that the decree was res
judicata. Inasmuch as the probate court of California, where the case
arose, had power to revise its own decrees when they were tainted by
mistake or fraud, equity could not revise them. Every objection here
made could have been made in the probate court. The court also made
this interesting observation: "In cases of fraud, equity has concurrent
jurisdiction with a court of law but in regard to a will charged to have
been obtained by fraud, this rule does not hold. It may be difficult to
assign any very satisfactory reason for this exception. That exclusive
jurisdiction over the probate of wills is vested in another tribunal is
the only one that can be given." On the face of the pleadings no
other result seems possible. No action in tort, however, for wrong to
the plaintiff's expectancy seems to have been considered.
In Gaines v. Chew 12 the heir charged that the true will had been
suppressed and that an earlier revoked will had been probated fraudulently by the defendant's executors named in the revoked will. It was
held that equity could not set aside the probate of a will and that relief
was obtainable in the probate court. But it also held that the defendants could be required to answer touching the alleged spoliation of the
later will. There is also a dictum to the effect that if the probate court
io. 116 Ohio St. 144, 156 N. E. 193 (1927).
II. 21 Wall. 503, 22 L. Ed. 599 (U. S. 1874).
12. 2 How. 61g, ii L. Ed. 402 (U. S. i844).
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should refuse a hearing because of defect of its power or lapse of time
or on any other ground, the chancery court might require the defendants to consent to the proof of the later will. This seems to mean that
the plaintiff could, in a chancery proceeding, prevent the defendants from taking advantage of the obstacles standing in the way
of setting up the later will. The court said that the plaintiff could
require the defendants to make explicit answers to the questions of
suppression of the one will and the probate of the other. This holding
seems to overlook the matter whether or not the probate decree was
res judicata. The court did not hold the decree to be void. There
are circumstances under which equity can give relief against a valid
decree and apparently the circumstances here recited were regarded as
sufficient if relief in the probate court should fail. 13 It had previously
been held in England that in the case of personalty, the issue of fraud
or forgery in the procurement of a testament must first come before
the ecclesiastical court and when land was the subject matter, the issue
was for a common law court.1 4 But equity could direct that discovery
be had. Some earlier cases of relief in equity were explained in Archer
v. Mosse,1r on the ground that there had been no opposition to the
prayer that the chancellor direct an issue devisavit vel non. This later
view came down to American courts. Thus, in Armstrong v. Lear1
the Supreme Court held that equity had no jurisdiction where the
will had not been probated. In Tarver v. Tarver 17 the holding was
similar, but the court somewhat inconsistently made an interpretation
of the will and held that it was not conditional.
California considers that the raising of a constructive trust in
such a case constitutes a collateral attack upon the probate decree.1 8
The issue of forgery could have been presented to the probate court
for the purpose of preventing the proof of the will. California, however, will raise a constructive trust where the revocation of a will was
fraudulently prevented.' 9 A remedy in the probate court is not available in such a case.
13. The court examined a number of early authorities. In some the chancellor
held that he could pass in the first instance upon the validity of a will alleged to be
forged or could direct an issue devivazt vel non. Goss v. Tracy, i P. Wms. 286, 24
E. R. 392 (Ch. 1715) ; Welby v. Thornagh Prec. in Ch. 123, 24 E. R. 59 (1700) ;
Roberts v. Winn, i Ch. Rep. 236, 21 E. R. 56o (1663) ; Maundy v. Maundy, i Ch.
Rep. 123, 21 E. R. 526 (1638).
14. Jones v. Jones, 3 Meriv. 161, 1O3 E. R. 62 (Ch. 1817) ; Anon., 3 Atk. 17, 26
E. R. 813 (Ch. 1743) ; Bennet v. Vade, 2 Atk. 324, 26 E. R. 597 (Ch. 1742) ; Webb
v. Claverden, 2 Atk. 424, 26 E. R. 656 (Ch. 1742) ; Archer v. Mosse, 2 Vern. 8, 23 E.
R. 618 (Ch. 1686).
15. 2 Vern. 8, 23 E. R. 618 (Ch. I686).
6. 12 Wheat 169, 6 L. Ed. 589 (U. S. 1827).
17. 9 Pet. 174, 9 L. Ed. 91 (U. S. 1835).
18. Tracy v. Muir, 151 Cal. 363, 9o Pac. 832 (1907).
ig. Brazil v. Silva, 181 Cal. 490, 185 Pac. 174 (1919).
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2. Frustrationof Testamentary Execution
Inasmuch as the probate court cannot grant relief where the testator has been prevented from executing a will, the plaintiff would be
without remedy if a decree of distribution following a grant of letters
of administration were res judicata. May plaintiff have a choice
whether to proceed to set up a trust or to sue at law for tort? In the
first place, it is apparent that the influence used to prevent the testator from benefiting a particular legatee must be undue in order to be
actionable. So in Marshall v. De Haven 20 the plaintiff brought trespass against the defendant for inducing the decedent not to change his
will in the interest of the plaintiff. He alleged that the defendant paid
a large sum of money to prevent an alteration in the will beneficial to
the defendant, but no fraud or undue influence was directly charged.
Under such pleadings no trust could be declared. In Kansas the draftsman fraudulently omitted from the will a legacy for the plaintiff which
he had been directed by the testator to insert. 2 1 The court refused to
make the beneficiary heir-legatee a trustee because she was ignorant of
the fraud, although her husband was a party to it. While there seems
to be no adequate reason why a trust should not be raised to prevent
the heir or legatee from being unjustly enriched, a tort action would
not lie against her. One wonders, however, why the alternative remedy by way of suit against the draftsman and the colluding husband
was not resorted to. Such an action was not brought. The plaintiff
asked in the alternative for reformation of the will or for a constructive trust. Even though a court may refuse to raise a constructive
trust based upon unjust enrichment, the analogies favor an action for
damages against the wrongdoer.
In Ohio a tort action has been denied. Thus, in one case the
defendant had prevented the calling of attesters. 22 The plaintiff's
prospect was held not to be of such legal importance as to warrant
the protection of it, inasmuch as he had no vested interest in the decedent's property. His right was not considered equal to rights of another character, such as those in prospective contracts. It is this refusal to follow the contract analogy of the interference with contract
that seems wholly objectionable. Ohio, however, as will later be seen,
Pa. 187, 58 Atl. 141 (1904).
Dye v. Parker, io8 Kan. 304, 194 Pac. 640,

20. 209
21.

22. Cunningham v. Edward, 52 Ohio
HAM L. REv. 514. In Dixon v. Olmius, i

195

Pac. 599

(1921).

App. 61, 3 N. E. (2d) 58 (1936), 5 FoRDCox Eq. 414 (1787), the heir by force and

fraud had prevented the testator from making (republishing) his will, whereby plaintiff, the intended devisee, was deprived of his devise. A constructive trust was declared. See 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS (1939) § 489.4.
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allows a tort action for interference with one's prospect in a will already
executed.

23

On the other hand, protection has been extended in other states
to this interest of expectancy. Thus, in Massachusetts 24 the plaintiff
was held to state a cause of action in tort when he alleged that the
defendant, the confidential adviser of the testator, induced the latter
to draw a codicil which was and was intended by the defendant to be
invalid, in order to defraud the plaintiff of property he would other25
wise have received. So in Bohannon v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.
the plaintiff alleged that the decedent had formed the fixed purpose of
giving the former a share in his estate and that the defendant, either
by preventing the execution of a will beneficial to the plaintiff or by
causing a like will to be revoked, had defrauded him. He sought an
order to discover the facts, which was granted on the defendant's
motion to vacate the order; the plaintiff was held to have stated a
cause of action in tort.
Thus, it is seen that the inquiry in such cases is coming to be not,
Was the plaintiff vested with an interest in the property about to be
left to him, but rather, Was there a right to have his prospect not interfered with fraudulently which should be protected? There appears to
be no adequate reason why the plaintiff should not have alternative
remedies, one at law for tort to his expectancy or one in equity to raise
a trust.
3. Inducing the Revocation or Alteration of Wills
The leading case is Allen v. McPherson.2 6 A will and several
codicils had been offered for probate in the ecclesiastical court. The
last codicil revoked the provisions of a prior will and codicils by which
large bequests had been made to the plaintiff. The latter asked to
have the defendant declared a trustee and alleged that the last codicil
of the revoking will had been procured by the undue influence of the
residuary legatee. It was held that equity had no jurisdiction in the
matter for the reason that the ecclesiastical court had already investigated the same charge and found it to be untrue. The plaintiff's remedy was by way of appeal only.
The probate court has jurisdiction to determine whether a given
will had been revoked or altered by fraud or otherwise and its decree
on that issue is res judicata. If it should find that the revocation was
fraudulent, it would be able to set up the original will. Suppose, how23. Morton v. Petitt, 124 Ohio St. 241, 177 N. E. 59, (1931).
24. Lewis v. Corbin, 195 Mass. 520, 81 N. E. 248 (i9o7).
25. 21o N. C. 679, 18o S. E. 390 (1936).
See Note (1937) 22 CoRN. L. Q. 44o.
26. 1 H. L. Cas. 191, 9 E. R. 728 (Ch. 1847).
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ever, that the defendant has forged his own name as a beneficiary of a
legacy in substitution for the plaintiff. The court could refuse probate of that part of the will but that would not avail the plaintiff in
any way. Hence, it would be better to probate the will as an entirety
and have the defendant declared a trustee. This would probably be a
more adequate remedy than a tort action would be, 2' but the latter
action should be available.
Ohio adopted the theory of Allen v. McPherson, supra, under circumstances which were only formally similar. Thus, in Petitt v. Morton 28 a will benefiting plaintiff was revoked by a subsequent forged
will. This fact, however, unlike that in the English case, was not discovered for a period of eight years. Consequently, the issue of forgery
was not passed upon by the probate court. It was then too late to
ask the probate court to set the probate aside. The plaintiff asked
that the defendant be declared a trustee. The reason giveh for the
refusal was that a claimant under an unprobated will can show no interest. - It is appropriate that the plaintiff, who claims under a will,
should be required to establish his claim in the way provided by law.
The issue of forgery, however, had never been passed upon and no
finding thereqn by the probate court was implied or necessary. A
right of action in tort was not set up in the pleadings. The plaintiff
29
was thus fraudulently misled into believing that the will was valid.
Under such circumstances some courts hold that equity should give
relief, since it is impossible to have a remedy in the probate court, due
to lapse of time. This much is implied, if not actually expressed, in
Gaines v. Chew, supra. Why should not an action in tort also be
available?
In New York, Hutchins v. Hutchins3 0 (earlier than Lumley v.
Gye) held that inasmuch as the plaintiff had no interest in thd decedent's property, he could not have an action in tort for a wrong to his
expectancy. The plaintiff's father had made a will devising a farm
to the plaintiff. The defendants, being heirs, fraudulently induced the
father, a feeble old man, to make another will which omitted the plaintiff as a beneficiary. A later federal case, however, intimates that a
tort cause of action can be stated 31 and the plaintiff was merely required to make his allegations of fraud more specific. This holding is
possibly questionable, however, inasmuch as it is not clear that there
Marriot v. Marriot, i Strange 666, 93 E. R. 770 (K. B. 1726).
28. 28 Ohio App. 227, 162 N. E. 627 (1928). For the subsequent disposition of
this case, see Morton v. Petitt, 124 Ohio St. 241, 177 N. E. 591 (1931), and discussion
infra.
27.

29. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1942)

§ 121.

30. 7 Hill 104 (N. Y. 1845).

31. Murphy v. Mitchell, 245 Fed.

219

(N. D. N. Y. 1917).
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was anything to prevent the filing of a petition to set aside the probate
of the revoking will.
Massachusetts and North Carolina seem to approve of the position suggested above, that a tort action should lie. Thus, in May v.
Wood 32 an action in tort was brought for maliciously inducing the
testatrix to discharge the plaintiff from his employment and for causing the testatrix to revoke a legacy to the plaintiff. The court held
that the plaintiff should make his allegations of fraud more specific.
Chief Justice Holmes was of the opinion that they were already adequate. In Dulin v. Bailey 3 3 the plaintiff recovered in tort for the
spoliation by the defendant whereby the latter removed the part of
the will beneficial to the former. It was held that the plaintiff was
not required to have the provision for his legacy probated and this
action was not an attack upon the probate record.
It appears-then that in England no tort action is available if the
specific fraud was made an issue in the probate proceedings. In Massachusetts, North Carolina, and perhaps New York, an action in tort is
available assuming no issue of fraud was made in the probate proceedings. In Ohio a constructive trust is not a permitted remedy unless the plaintiff is an heir, but a tort remedy probably is allowed.
4. Frustration of Testamentary Revocation
Many of the cases, especially the earlier ones, are concerned with
the question whether a will directed by the testator to be destroyed but
which was fraudulently preserved, could be regarded as revoked. No
other remedy seems to have been considered in the cases. Generally
it has been held that some revocatory act is required by statute in addi34
tion to the direction to destroy in order to accomplish a revocation.
In some states, under the statutes then prevailing, the will was regarded
as revoked.

35

In Vermont a dictum says that equity will interfere to defeat
the fraud of the preserver but whether by constructive trust, by refusing probate, by declaring a revocation in equity, by setting the will
32. 172

Mass. 1I, 51 N. E. 191 (1898).

33. 172 N. C. 6o8, go S. E. 689 (1916).
34. Bohleber v. Rebstock 255 Ill. 53, 99 N. E. 75 (1912); Thomas v. Briggs, 98
Ind. App. 352, 189 N. E. 389 (1934) ; Axe v. Wilson, 150 Kan. 794, 96 P. (2d) 88o
(1939) ; Mundy v. Mundy, 2 McCart. 290 (N. J. Eq. 1858) ; Leaycraft v. Simmons, 3
Bradf. 35 (N. Y. 1854) (civil law rule contra) ; Hise v. Fincher, Io Ired. 139 (N. C.
1849) ; Kent v. Mahaffey, IO Ohio St. 204 (x859) ; Means v. Moore, 3 McCord 282
(S. C. 1825) ; Boyd v. Cook, 3 Leigh 32 (Va. 1831) ; Williams v. Williams, 33 Beav.
306, 55 E. R. 385 (1863).
35. Card v. Grinman, 5 Conn. 164 (1823) (court admits the evidence of fraud
which seems to indicate that revocation in this way is possible). In North Carolina
[see Hise v. Fincher, io Ired. 139 (N. C. 1849)], though such evidence was admitted,
the revocation was not admissible. See Smiley v. Gambill, 2 Head 164 (Tenn. 1863).
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aside, or in some other way is not indicated. 86 A Kentucky dictum
favors a constructive trust.3 7 Concededly the probate court has no
power to raise it 33 and in order to set one up in equity, it would be
necessary to prove clearly that the will probated was fraudulently preserved and did not express the wishes of the decedent.3 9 California
will award a remedy by raising a trust.4° The probate decree is not
res judicata of the fraud issue and the action is not a collateral attack.
Florida will not do so, 41 because the plaintiff has no sufficient interest
in the property to warrant it. In such a case, however, a tort action
should lie, not because plaintiff had a present interest in the property
but rather because he had a provable expectancy and a cause of action
arose for wrongful interference with it. No case has been found, however, of this type where an action in tort was brought.
5. The Suppression and Spoliation of Wills
Some of the possible remedies for spoliation or suppression of a
will may be (a) to resist in the probate court the probate of a conflicting will and to admit proof of the suppressed will by such evidence
as may be available; (b) to sue in tort; (c) to ask that a trust be
raised; (d) to bring a bill in equity to set up the spoliated will.
In Washington it was held that the plaintiff must offer the suppressed will fbr probate within the time limited for probate. Any action for an accounting and to impose a trust upon the suppresser was
regarded as an attack upon the provisions of the probate decree. 42
The plaintiff need not prove the suppressed will in its entirety but only
his own interest. Here a tort action might well be preferable because
the evidence of the suppression and the disadvantage to the plaintiff
might well be established more easily in a tort action than in a probate proceeding. In Massachusetts also, as held in Thayer v.
Kitchen,43 a general demurrer in a tort action is to be sustained where
the plaintiff still has recourse to probate. This case, however, is not
authority for the proposition that a tort action would not lie if the
time for probate had elapsed. It would seem that if there is nothing
36. Blanchard v. Blanchard,

32 Vt. 62 (1859).
37. Gains v. Gains, 2 Marsh. 6o9 (Ky. 182o).
§ 489.2.

See 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS (1939)

38. Graham v. Burch, 47 Minn. 171, 49 N. W. 697 (i8gi).
39.
4o.
41.
guishes
ing out
42.
43.

Ibid.
Brazil v. Silva, 181 Cal. 490, 185 Pac. 174 (1919).
Moneyham v. Hamilton, 124 Fla. 43o, 168 So. 522 (1936) (the court distinbetween a frustration of an attempt to revoke and the prevention of the carryof an intent to revoke).
Davis v. Seavey, 95 Wash. 57, 163 Pac. 35 (1917).
200 Mass. 382, 86 N. E. 952 (199o).
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to prevent probate, it would be better to do so than to sue in an ordi44
nary action at law.

The plaintiff's position, under the circumstances in which he finds
himself, is improved by the presumption indulged against a despoiler.
Strict proof of the contents of the will is not required and the evidence
45
may sustain the plaintiff's case, although it be vague and uncertain.
A similar consideration is shown to the plaintiff in suits involving commercial transactions, even to the extent that, having destroyed the evidence, the defendant is presumed to admit the plaintiff's allegations.4 6
As against the despoiler of a will, the legatee has been allowed to
prove his own interest only, in a will contest. He may introduce the
statements of the decedent in proof of his claim and the court will presume that a wilfully destroyed will was duly executed. 4 7 Under the
older practice that the validity of a devise was finally to be determined
in an action at law, two witnesses were not necessary to establish the
will, as they are for proving a will in probate court 48 and a surrogate
49
finding against a devise did not bind a law court.
Although the chancellor is usually held to have no jurisdiction to
set up an unprobated will,8" yet a remedy closely similar was adopted
in a few cases. Thus, a bill to compel a suppresser to produce the
will, or in the alternative to hold for the plaintiff the land involved;
to require the execution of a deed to the latter and to enjoin the defendant from asserting a claim to the property has been sustained. 51
This method is not unlike the setting up of a trust. So in England the
court has, at times, decreed that the plaintiff may hold the property
until the defendant produces the will 52 and a bill to pay a legacy has
been sustained in equity, 53 although the will had not been probated.
The latter cases are somewhat analogous to those which hold strongly
44. Cf. Axe v. Wilson, 15o Kan. 794, 96 P. (2d) 88o (1939).
45. Anderson v. Irwin, 1I Ill. 411 (1882).
46. Thompson v. Thompson, 9 Ind. 323 (1857) ; Pomeroy v. Benton, 77 Mo. 64, 86
(1882); Armory v. Delamirie, i Strange 5o5, 93 E. R. 664 (K. B. 1722) (the truth
of the plaintiff's evidence is presumed to be admitted because of the defendant's fraud
in destroying the evidence). See 2 WIGmoE, EViDENCE (3d ed. 194o) §§ 278, 291, and
9 id. § 2524 and citations there made, and cases cited in notes 26-30 supra.
47. Lane v. Cole, 12 Barb. 68o (N. Y. 1852) ; Davis v. Lovell, 4 M. & W. 678, 150
E. R. 1593 (Ex. 1839). Cf. Robinson v. Trull, 4 Cush. 249 (Mass. 1849); In re
Pierce, 163 N. C. 247, 79 S. E. 507 (1913).
48. Cunningham v. Edward, 52 Ohio App. 6I, 3 N. E. (2d) 58 (1936).
49. See Allen v. Grant, 183 App. Div. 555, 171 N. Y. Supp. 769 (1918).
5o. McDaniel v. Pattison, 98 Cal. 86, 27 Pac. 651, 32 Pac. 8o5 (893) ; Morningstar v. Selby, 15 Ohio 345 (1846); Myers v. O'Hanlon, 13 Rich. 196 (S. C. 1861).
Contra: Buchanan v. Matlock, 8 Hump. 390 (Tenn. 1847).
5I. Bailey v. Stiles, i Green 220 (N. J. Eq. 1839).
52. Hampden v. Hampden, 3 Brown 550, 1 E. R. 1492 (H. L. 1709), and see Dalston v. Coatsworth, i P. Wins. 731, 24 E. R. 589 (Rolls Ct. 1721).
53. Tucker v. Phipps, 3 Atk. 359, 26 E. R. ioo8 (Ch. 1746).
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against the despoiler. So in Vermont equity decreed the payment of
54
legacies in a will fraudulently suppressed and never probated.
Other states have held that a tort action may be sustained, though
the suppressed will is never offered for probate. 55 In Ohio the court
believes that a stronger case is made out for the victim of a spoliated
will than for one who merely claims that the will in his favor was
never made, due to the fraud of the defendant. 5 6 A constructive trust
was denied in the latter situation, but no action in tort was attempted.
It is agreed that a stronger interest is created, one in the nature of a
gift on a condition subsequent, where the will has been executed but
suppressed, than the interest arising where no will has ever been
made. The plaintiff, besides damages, may recover his costs, expenses for proving the spoliation of the will, for his time, and other
losses. 57 Several cases hold that an offer of probate is not a prerequisite to an action in tort or to one for setting up a trust.58 The
conclusion seems to be, by weight of authority, that if a' destroyed
or suppressed will can be probated, it should be, but if not, there is
no bar to a tort action.
It has been suggested that an action for damages for loss of evidence may be available in these cases. If the plaintiff summons a witness in a common law action who fails to appear, without cause, he
may be liable for all the damages sustained by the former. It has
even been held that the plaintiff need not prove that he had a good
cause of action in the case for which the defendant was subpcenaed,
though some courts would probably hold that the plaintiff should
make out a prima facie case for recovery in the other action. 59 So,
in Dulin v. Bailey,6 0 the plaintiff was permitted to prove his right to
a legacy in a tort action by only one witness, whereas two are required to prove the contents of a will offered for probate. 6 ' The
54. Mead v. Langdon (1834), referred to only in Adams v. Adams, 22 Vt. 50, 59
(1849).
55. Creek v. Laski, 248 Mich. 425, 227 N. W. 817

N. C. 6o8, go S. E. 689 (1916); Morton v. Petitt,

(1929)

; Dulin v. Bailey, 172

124 Ohio St. 241, 177

N. E. 59i

(1931).
56. Cunningham v. Edward, 52 Ohio App. 6I, 3 N. E. (2d) 58 (1936).

57. Taylor v. Bennett, i Ohio C. C. 95 (1885).
58. See It re Estate of Lambie, 97 Mich. 49, 56 N. W. 223 (1893) ; Dulin v. Bailey, 172 N. C. 6o8, 9o S. E. 689 (igi6) (defense was that the plaintiff should first
offer will for probate) ; Mead v. Langdon (1834), referred to only in Adams v. Adams,
22 Vt. 5o, 59 (1849) ; Tucker v. Phipps, 3 Atk. 359, 26 E. R. ioo8 (Ch. 1746) ; Hampden v. Hampden, 3 Brown 550, i E. R.

59' Lane v. Cole,

12
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(H. L. 1709).

Barb. 68o (N. Y. 1852) ; Davis v. Lovell, 4 M. & W. 678, i5o

E. R. 1593 (Ex. 1839). Cf. Robinson v. Trull, 4 Cush. 249 (Mass. 1849); In re
Pierce, 163 N. C. 247, 79 S. E. 507 (1913). Respecting proof of revocation appearing

in a lost will by fewer than the statutory number required to probate a will, see Evans,
Testamentary Revocation by Subsequent Instrument (1934) 22 KY. L. J. 469, 497.
6o. 172 N. C. 6o8, 90 S. E. 689 (igi6).
61. See Creek v. Laski, 248 Mich. 425, 227 N. W. 817 (1929), (1930) 30 COL. L.
REV. 49, (1930) 14 MI N. L. RM. 704; Tucker v. Phipps, 3 Atk. 359, 26 E. R. ioo8
(Ch. 1746) (bill in equity for same purpose).
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plaintiff, in such a case, may prove his own legacy without proof of
entire will, though generally to procure probate, proof of the entire
contents of a lost will is likely to be required. When the claimant
raises an issue as to his interest in a lost and unprobated will, the matter of the right to evidence becomes of great importance. Thus, if the
plaintiff is required to probate the will in order to establish his claim,
he may fail. 62 Equity cannot order the will to probate. Even if the
will could be proved, the question may arise whether the procedure
to probate it would not be an attack upon a prior final decree of distribution. 63 It is not clear why the plaintiff should not recover damages for the destruction of the will

14

and his consequent inability to

probate it or even raise a constructive trust in the proper case.6 5
Recovery has been allowed for the additional costs and expense of
proving a will caused by defendant's wrongful suppression.6 6
6. Fraudulent Inter-Vivos Conveyances
As noted above, one aspect of Hall v. Hall6 7 involved an allegation that the defendants had conspired to have the decedent father
transfer to plaintiff's co-heirs certain property, thus preventing the
plaintiff from receiving his portion of it by inheritance or by will.
The demurrer to the petition admitted this allegation to be true. The
court held that the plaintiff's expectation was not a legal property interest and that the plaintiff had no cause of action. Thus, here again
is a clear refusal to extend to an expectancy of inheritance the protection which has come to be extended in a wide field of transactions.6
Somewhat similar is the case of Ross v. Wright.69 The decedent
had directed the defendant, his son, the officer of a business trust,
charged with the duty of making all transfers, to transfer fifty shares
of his stock in the trust to plaintiff, decedent's granddaughter. The
defendant refused to do so save on condition that certain other shares
should also be assigned to himself and his sisters. The decedent died
soon thereafter, before being able freely to complete the gift. The
defendant demurred to these allegations. It was held that the plaintiff
62. McDaniel v. Pattison, 98 Cal. 86, 27 Pac. 651, 32 Pac. 805 (1893) ; Thayer v.
Kitchen, 20o Mass. 382, 86 N. E. 952 (19o9).
63. Held not in Walker's Estate, 16o Cal. 547, 550, 117 Pac. 510, 511 (1911).
64. See Dulin v. Bailey, 172 N. C. 6o8, go S. E. 689 (1916).
65. See Mead v. Langdon (1834), referred to only in Adams v. Adams, 22 Vt. 5o,
59 (849).

66. Taylor v. Bennett, i Ohio C. C. 95 (1885).
67. 9I Conn. 514, ioO Atl. 44I (igi6).
68. See Note (1917) 27 YALE L. J. 263. Cf. It re Lage, ig F. (2d) 153 (N. D.
Iowa 1927), holding that the expectancy under a binding contract does not pass to the
trustee in bankruptcy of the expectant devisee.
69. 286 Mass. 269, 19o N. E. 514 (I934), 14 B. U. L. REv. 86o. See Notes (935)
48 HAzv. L. REv. 984, (1934) io NoTmR DAmE LAwYER 94.
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had no cause of action because the defendant was under no duty to
the plaintiff to act and the refusal to act did not involve fraud, duress
or undue influence.
The court was influenced by the proposition that the conduct of
the defendant was negative. . The distinction between nonfeasance and
misfeasance, however, is often blurred by the situation. The refusal
to act by one who alone has the legal power to accomplish a certain
result is far different from such a refusal when other avenues are
readily open to the petitioner. In this case it amounts to duress, which
prevents the decedent from carrying out his purpose. The plaintiff
had an expectation of a gift and its consummation was prevented by
the interference of the defendant. This interference is duress in negative form.
Did the defendant owe any duty to the plaintiff ? It was his obligation to perform this service and it is arguable, therefore, that the
trust estate would have been chargeable for the loss to the plaintiff if
a suit had been properly brought against the trustee70 The defendant
knew that his conduct would cause the plaintiff the loss of a gift save
on the performance of a condition which he had no right to impose. It
71
seems that under these circumstances he owed a duty to the plaintiff.
Thus, if the plaintiff had alleged a sale to herself of the stock, the contract to be performed only on the transfer being made on the books
and had further declared that the defendant had refused to make the
transfer for the purpose of preventing the performance of the contract,
she would have stated a cause of action. The conduct of the defendant
was analogous to a conversion of the stock.7 2 It cannot be denied that
the defendant was the active cause of the plaintiff's loss. "When the
agent knowingly fails to perform, he is consciously subjecting a known
person to a known danger." 73
7. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud
The granting of relief from probate decrees is often made to depend upon the question whether the fraud practiced by the beneficiary
is of the type so-called intrinsic or, on the other hand, is described as
extrinsic. Thus, in La Salle v. Peterson,7 4 the court declared that
fraud such as was required to set aside a decree must be extrinsic or
collateral to the questions determined in the action, that a decree would
70. See Erie R. R. v. Stewart, 40 F. (2d) 855 (C. C. A. 6th,
71. See 4 RESTATEmENT, ToRTs (1939) § 87ob.

193o).

72. See i RFTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934)

§ 223.
73. Seavey, The Liability of an Agent in Tort (1916)
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 353 and caveat thereto.
74. 220 Cal. 739, 32 P. (2d) 612 (1934).

I So. L. Q. 16, 36.
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not be annulled merely because it had been obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. If the plaintiff had an opportunity to
make the truth appear at the trial, there could be no relief merely because he was overborne by perjured testimony or his inability to present the true facts. In Tracy v. Muir,7 5 the heir filed a bill to make
the executor a constructive trustee. She alleged that the will was a
forgery and that probate had been obtained by perjured testimony
through a conspiracy and that certain of the conspirators were on the
jury which found for the will. The plaintiff was domiciled in Hawaii
and had no knowledge of the proceedings. Notice of probate had,
however, been given in accordance with the statute. The fact that
the plaintiff was not a party prevented her from being bound by the
decree but she was held to be bound by a statute making probate con76
clusive after a year.
On the other hand, in another case 77 the executrix was the widow
of the decedent and also the mother of a child not his child. In her
petition for probate she alleged that the child was decedent's also. She
obtained a decree giving a share of the property to her child by false
evidence. The other infant children did not have their day in court.
It was held that the decedent's infant children had not had their day
in court and that this concealment, while not sufficient to set the decree aside, was a sufficient basis for a constructive trust. In Weyant
v. Utah Savings & Trust Co. 7 8 the decedent had abandoned his wife

and children, had eloped with the defendant and had lived with her
under a fictitious name for many years. On his death, the defendant
was named administratrix and notice of proceedings was given, in
accordance with the statute, but under the assumed name, which
afforded no means of knowledge to the deserted family. Here the
plaintiffs, on discovery of the facts, were successful in setting aside
the probate proceedings after it was too late to proceed in the probate
court. The remedy was held to be a direct attack based on extrinsic
79

fraud.

75. 151 Cal. 363, 90 Pac. 832 (1907). See also Langdon v. Blackburn, 1o9 Cal. ig,
41 Pac. 814 (i895) (the plaintiff lived in a remote district, will forged, no allegation
of failure of notice) ; Stowe v. Stowe, 140 Mo. 594, 41 S. W. 95i (1897). Sometimes,
also, plaintiff seeks, in effect, to have a court of equity probate the will; see McDaniel
v. Pattison, 98 Cal. 86, 27 Pac. 651, 32 Pac. 805 (1893). See also Davis v. Seavey,
95 Wash. 57, 163 Pac. 35 (917).
76. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1942) § 126 (2) (a), (b), and (d).
77. Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323, 67 Pac. 282 (1902). Why was the decree of
distribution not void on this showing?
78. 54 Utah i8i, 182 Pac. 189 (I919). See also Baker v. O'Riordan, 65 Cal. 368,
4 Pac. 232 (1884) ; Langdon v. Blackburn, IO9 Cal. i9, 41 Pac. 814 (i895), referred
to in notes 7 and 75 mtpra; Hall v. Hall, 91 Conn. 514, ioo At. 44i (i9i6), discussed
at page i89 supra.

79. For reasons for refusal to use these terms, see
(1942) § ii8b.
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In Benson v. Anderson 80 the petition showed that on the death
of the husband, his wife legally inherited one-half of the land in the
estate. The probate court, however, erroneously decreed all the property to the decedent's brother. After the time for appeal had expired,
a bill was filed by the widow to set aside the decree. The decree was
annulled and a new distribution was made. The widow was Danish
and had no knowledge of English and so it might be said that she
had no notice."'
Thus, it appears that a probate decree may be directly assailed if
those disappointed had no reasonable opportunity to be heard. 82 Relief will not, however, be granted where the decree is merely erroneous,
or inequitable, or was obtained by false or perjured testimony, 3 or
where the complainant had no actual knowledge of the proceedings,
but there was an opportunity to be heard, as the statute requires.
8. Attack upon the Probate Decree
A serious issue is the question how the remedy in tort for damages to plaintiff's expectancy is affected by a prior probate decree.
(a) It seems to be granted that if a remedy is provisionally available both in the probate court and in a laW or equity court, the former
is to be preferred. Thus, where plaintiff claims that a will has been
wrongfully procured, he should preferably contest it rather than sue in
tort. Much the same result, however, would accrue if plaintiff should
be successful, whichever course were followed. 84 So also if the plaintiff voluntarily abandons a contest proceeding which he has begun, he
is later prohibited from substantially setting aside the decree in equity
by setting up a constructive trust.8 5 Where the will has been suppressed or destroyed, it may still be probated, if the evidence was not
destroyed. 6 This leaves the question still open for an action in tort
if the plaintiff should fail in the probate court because of the destruction of evidence by the defendant. Where the plaintiff claims the
defendant's legacy has been forged, he should establish the fact at
probate and not allow the entire will to be proved and contemplate
thereafter a correction of the finding in equity.8 7 So a payment to the
defendant, as executrix, under a probated will cannot be assailed in a
8o. io Utah 135, 37 Pac. 256 (1894).
8i. Case is disapproved of in Sohler v. Sohler, I35 Cal.
82. See RESTATEmENT, JUDGMENTS (1942) §§ 118-124.

323,

67 Pac. 282 (1902).

83. See id. § 126.
84. Axe v. Wilson, i5o Kan. 794, 96 P. (2d) 880 (1939).
85. Tracy v. Muir, 15r Cal. 363, 9o Pac. 832 (19o7).
86. Thayer v. Kitchen, 200 Mass. 382, 86 N. E. 952 (1909) ; Davis v. Seavey, 95
Wash. 57, 163 Pac. 35 (917).
87. Plume v. Beale, I P. Wins. 388, 24 E. R. 438 (Ch. 1717).
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different action

8

and a finding as to heirship precludes omitted heirs

89
from attacking the title to land in equity.

(b) Equity has often declared a constructive trust based on the
promises of a devisee or legatee to hold for another 1o and upon the
promises of an heir to hold for a third person in consideration that
the decedent make no will.1 The probate court could give no remedy
in such cases. The issues considered here arise on unperformed promises, and are appropriately viewed as trust problems.
(c) There should be no difficulty in raising a constructive trust
in the case of the frustration of a revocation, at least where the one
who intervenes is the beneficiary,92 though it has been held otherwise
in Florida. 3 The probate court can afford no remedy. There it was
thought that mere frustration was insufficient to show that plaintiff
had an interest in the property. This is not necessarily an indication
that plaintiff would have failed in a tort action. So in the case of
frustration of the execution of a will, a constructive trust should be
imposed upon the wrongdoing beneficiary for the same reason. 4 In
the case of the suppression, spoliation or destruction of a will, the
wrongful act may occasion the probate of an earlier will no longer
expressive of the testator's intent. Or it may cause an apparent intestacy, thus favoring the heirs.
In England it was once decreed that plaintiff, on proof of his
claim in equity, should hold and enjoy the estate until the suppresser
should produce the will. Thus, probate was not a necessary preliminary. 95 In case probate is still possible, that should be the procedure, 96 but it does not follow that if probate is no longer possible,
there is no alternative remedy. Probate may be impossible because
the defendant has deprived the plaintiff of the proof required to establish a will. This is a wrong involving the plaintiff's loss of evidence
88. Noell v. Wells, i Lev. 235 (K. B. 1668).
89. Christianson v. King Co., 239 U. S.356, 372, 36 Sup. Ct. 114,

121,

6o L. Ed.

327, 335 (1915).
90. 2 Sco, TRUSTS (1939) § 55.1, 55.6, 114, and 3 id.§ 359.
91. 2 id. § 55.3, 55-4, 78, x13, and 3 id.§ 362.5.
92. Brazil v. Silva, 18rL Cal. 490, 185 Pac. 174 (19:9) ; Gains v. Gains, 2 Marsh. 6o9
(Ky. 1820) ; Blanchard v. Blanchard, 32 Vt. 62 (1859).
93. Moneyham v. Hamilton, 124 Fla. 430, 168 So. 522 (1936).

94. Thomas v. Briggs, 98 Ind. App. 352, i8g N. E. 389 (1934) ; Dixon v. Olmius,

i Cox Eq. 414 (1787). See 3 ScoT, TRusTs (0939) §489.4. Cf. Dye v. Parker, io8
Kan. 304, 194 Pac. 64o, 95 Pac. 599 (92)
(prevention of making a legacy).
95. Hampden v. Hampden, 3 Brown 550, 1 E. R. 1492 (H. L. 1709) ; Dalston v.
Coatsworth, I P. Wins. 73I, 24 E. R. 589 (Rolls Ct. 1721) (without probate, the heir

required to assign for benefit of the plaintiff). For similar action in New Jersey, see
Bailey v. Stiles, i Green 220 (N. J. Eq. 1839), and in Vermont, Mead and Langdon
(1834), referred to in Adams v. Adams, 22 Vt. 50, 59 (1849) ; Blanchard v. Blanchard,
32 Vt. 62 (1859).
96. Thayer v. Kitchen, 2oo Mass. 382, 86 N. E. 952 (1o99) ; Davis v. Seavey, 95
Wash. 57, 163 Pac. 35 (1917).
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and a tort remedy should be available. 97 This remedy constitutes no
attack upon the probate decree. 98 An essentially different cause of
action is stated in the complaint. The plaintiff may even recover costs
and expenses arising from the additional burden cast upon him in
proving the will, due to the defendant's wrongful act.9 9 Perhaps the
action for costs could sound either in tort or in contract if it were
brought separately.
The plaintiff misconceives his remedy when he seeks to have a
will set up in equity.10 0 Yet, while the plaintiff cannot have probate
in equity,' 0 ' it does not follow that he could not have an action in
tort because of his loss of evidence, which loss made probate impossible. That in such case he would have a tort remedy in Ohio is
implied also from Seeds v. Seeds,10 2 where that remedy is made available in the case of the probate of a forged will. Ohio holds, however,
that a trust remedy is not granted in the case of a claimant not an
heir under an unprobated will. The question whether a tort action
could be had was not raised. There was no intimation, however, that
such an action would be a collateral attack upon a decree probating a
fraudulent will.
Where a revoking will was suppressed, the United States Supreme
Court allowed a bill in equity for discovery and accounting respecting
the earlier will.' 0 3 Probate was held. unnecessary, probably because
it was impossible to prove the suppressed will. It is not clearly stated,
however, that the primary wrong to plaintiff was the destruction of
evidence. If the one obtaining wrongful probate is in some measure a
04
fiduciary, there exists an independent ground for creating a trust.
The present argument points to the conclusion that interferences
with benefits reasonably to be expected from decedents' estates, where
the circumstances are susceptible of proof persuasive to a jury, are,
after all, indistinguishable from interferences with prospective advantages in business relations and other types of cases. If there has been
a prior probate proceeding, however, it cannot be collaterally attacked.
This prior proceeding explains the quandary of the court in the case
of Broderick's Will.'0 5 In general the probate court cannot deal with
the problem of damages where a decedent has been restrained from
97. Creek v. Laski, 248 Mich. 425, 227 N. W. 817 (1929); Dulin v. Bailey, 172
N. C. 602, 9o S. E. 689 (igi6).
98. Dulin v. Bailey, 172 N. C. 6o8, go S. E. 689 (igi6).
99. Taylor v. Bennett, i Ohio C. C. 95 (1885).
ioo. Morningstar v. Selby, 15 Ohio 345 (1846).
IOI. McDaniel v. Pattison, 98 Cal. 86, 27 Pac. 651, 32 Pac. 8o5 (1893).
1O2. 116 Ohio St. 144, 156 N. E. 193 (1927).

How. 61g, ii L. Ed. 402 (U. S. 1844).
Segrave v. Kirwan, Beat. 157 (Ir. Ch. 1828).
105. 21 Wall. 5o3, 22 L. Ed. 599 (U. S. 1874), cited at page 19o supra.
103. Gaines v. Chew, 2
1O4.
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making a will benefiting the plaintiff, or has been prevented from
revoking or altering a will already made or has been denied the right
to revoke or alter it. In the case of fraudulent inter-vivos conveyances
having a similar effect, no issue can arise respecting an attack on the
probate decree and nothing stands in the way to prevent the recognition of the interference as a wrong. On the other hand, probate courts
generally can refuse probate to fraudulent or forged wills and can give
relief where proper proof is produced that a will has been suppressed or
despoiled save where the plaintiff has been deprived by the defendant's
act of the evidence necessary to establish it. In cases where the raising of a constructive trust is appropriate, it is difficult to see why an
alternative remedy in tort generally should not exist. A probate decree should be held void where the injured claimant has had no opportunity to be heard due to the fraud of the proponent. This situation has often been said to illustrate the so-called extrinsic fraud. In
the case where no relief is given, the fraud is often called intrinsic,
affecting, as it does, the issues involved and the proof of them.

